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ABSTRACT

South Africa is in a state of transition. In viewing the struggle between apartheid's defenders and its opponents, social scientists can make the valuable contribution of projecting alternative scenarios of change as it relates to the way in which state institutions intersect with society. This paper is part of a larger study of South Africa that examined the relationship between state policy and social science influences and contending theories of political change and control. Contemporary themes in South African politics are briefly outlined, and the importance of newly introduced political and administrative structures is emphasized. It is a major thesis of the paper that the impact of these new structures, supported by social science theory, may both contribute to the dismantling of apartheid and define the developmental strategies adopted by a majority rule government. The paper suggests that there have been four separate social science ideologies that have defined the policy debate in South Africa since 1948: (1) modernization theory; (2) dependency theory; (3) corporatism; and (4) the concept of internal colonialism as exemplified by South Africa's "homelands" system. Each of these is discussed with a particular focus on how the specific theory has been used to promote and attack racially based political structures and public policy in South Africa. (DB)

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Social Science Theory, Development Management  
and the Local State in South Africa:

A Preliminary Survey of Issues

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Frequently late and overcrowded trains, rude booking clerks, freezing coaches and furious bosses is what a Mabopane/Soshanguve commuter has to contend with daily...commuters jostle each other in a bid to get through the doors and windows. The rush is for seats.<sup>1</sup>

This is how a newspaper account in the mid-1980s described the daily commuter trains from Bophuthatswana into Pretoria. Over 300,000 people live in a segment of this "independent" homeland 25 miles north of the South African capital. Most of the adults commute to work daily either into the city of Pretoria or to "border area" industrial parks outside the homeland.

Politics in South Africa are among the most controversial in the world. It is the only country in the late twentieth century which has a de jure or legalized system of racial segregation. Since 1948, under apartheid, black South Africans have been relegated to ten "homeland" areas and a number of segregated urban townships, bedroom communities linked to but separated from the major metropolitan centers. Blacks of African origin, who account for over 70% of the population, have no effective political rights in the 83% of the land area that has been reserved for whites.

The demographics of South Africa tell the tale. In the year 2000, white South Africans, as a percentage of total population of the country will fall to less than 10% or slightly more than the current percentage of whites in Namibia. Over the past sixty years, the dominant white population has fallen from a high of 22% in 1921 to 15% in 1985. By the early twenty first century, the white population could be as low as 8% of the total population of the country.

Over the next twelve years, black professionals will come to dominate the South African economy. The shift has been and will be dramatic. In 1960, for example, only 28 Africans obtained the matriculation exemption necessary for admission to University. At that time, blacks, African, mixed race and Indian students, comprised only 11% of all university students. By 1984, blacks had come to make up the majority of the matriculants. They currently make up two thirds of the teacher training college students and one third of all university students. By 1994, blacks will constitute the majority of all university graduates.<sup>2</sup>

By the early 1990s, black South Africans will be the fastest growing segment of the country's professional, managerial and business class. Given these demographics, it is not likely, twenty-five years after the dismantling of the colonial empires, that black elites

will submit to being the only national bourgeoisie to remain dominated in their own state. As with every national bourgeoisie from Egypt to Zimbabwe, they will no longer seek to join the settler bourgeoisie, but to

displace it: to enjoy the power and patronage of hegemony.<sup>3</sup>

### The Nature of the Problem

Decisions in F.W. de Klerk's South Africa are being made on a month to month and even day to day basis. It is premature to suggest that any fundamental changes are likely to come from within the apartheid system itself. In fact cosmetic changes in petty apartheid may often occur in a way which masks structural changes designed to bolster a "neo-apartheid" system of the future. Patterns of insitutional control should be seen within the overall context of a South African government strategy for survival. As Christopher Hill points out, "the game being played now is the politics of survival, no longer the politics of domination."<sup>4</sup>

Bureaucratic procedures and pattens of political mediation and control have a tendency to outlast the political ideology and the public policy process which put them in place. Thus a clear understanding of the political and adminstrative structures now being put in place in South Africa's industrial cities, its urban townships and its homelands may contribute to a future understanding of institutional barriers to rural and urban development in an non-racial South Africa or Azania.

This paper is part of a much larger study of South Africa which examines the relationship between state policy and social science influences and contending theories of political change and control. Far from being esoteric and unrelated to the policy making processes in South Africa, social scientists are on the frontline of the struggle between the state and it opponents as they project alternative scenarios of change as it relates to the "local state," that is the way in which state institutions intersect with society.

The first course of study in "native law and administration" was established in 1918 at the University of Good Hope. (Dirk A. Kotze, "The Rise and Decline of Native Administration," Teaching Political Science, vol. 4, no. 2, January, 1977), pp. 235-246) Beginning in the 1940s, directors of Admininstration Boards and rural administrators took classes in applied social science and Bantu languages and administration. (Bekker and Humphries, 1985: 35) More generally, as Adam and Moodley point out,

...social science literature on ideology, particularly from political scientists, fails to analyze the degree of conviction in professed claims. (Adam & Moodley, 1986:132)

The purpose of this paper is to examine, in preliminary form some of these "professed claims," ie. ideologies that have been and will be applied to the historical evolution of the South African regime at the third, second and first tiers of government. The survey should be treated as prelimina as its purpose is to

set the stage for a two year field based research effort designed to link up past ideological frameworks with an analysis of present and future political structures and processes. The focal point of this research is the extent to which current efforts to "depoliticize" policy making will limit policy choices faced by South Africa's first post-apartheid government.

### Contemporary Themes in South African Politics

The decade of the 1980s, provides the backdrop to a demographic and managerial revolution which is at the core of the depoliticization process. As such it has been characterized by a number of both mutually reinforcing and contradictory themes as South Africa moves slowly toward a negotiated, majority rule, post-apartheid state.

A first theme of South African politics in the past decade has been the development of a new strength and influence of both international and internal majority rule forces including the United Democratic Front, the African National Congress and the National Forum. Some coalition of these groups (and other "progressive" forces)<sup>5</sup> represent the likely successor regime to the current Nationalist Party government. The current state of emergency and the effective banning of the seventeen internal organizations in February of 198<sup>6</sup> has in no way diminished the influence that both internal and external anti-parliamentary groups have among black South Africans.

Ironically, and not surprisingly, the strength of the non-parliamentary forces in South Africa has been mirrored by the dramatic increase in the influence of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces on the right. Spurred on by the limited reforms being introduced by the Botha and de Klerk governments, the right wing Conservative Party led by Andries Truernicht has taken over as the official opposition in the white parliament and now controls a significant number of middle level city councils in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the Northern Cape.

Along with the rise in influence of the extra-parliamentary groups, and no doubt because of it, there has developed, under the State of Emergency, a system of militarized political control which is both all-incompassing and effective. This includes the use of the military to control the forces of change in the black townships, the effective abolition of all political activity by internally based political forces and the use of "hot pursuit" to attack guerillas of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress in South Africa's neighboring states. In the past four years South Africa has attacked Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland and Angola (with its attacks against SWAPO and support for the UNITA guerillas).<sup>8</sup>

A third and somewhat ambiguous theme has become apparent in South Africa since the early 1980s. That is there has been a recognition by the ruling forces in the Nationalist Party under

P.W. Botha that "Grand Apartheid," the division of the country into ten African homelands, will not provide a satisfactory political dispensation for this rapidly industrializing and urbanizing society. The homelands are too small, too fragmented and politically flawed to provide a significant outlet for black political demands within the country.

This has led to a fourth pattern of events since 1979. The South African government has introduced a series of conservative but not inconsequential reforms designed to create a group defined multi-racial state in which market forces predominate within the context of a political "power-sharing" arrangement. The significance of these reforms is that they do indicate a real shift away from geographically based "Grand Apartheid." However, while some socio-economic reforms, in particular the legalization of black trade unions and the end of influx control, are important, the Nationalist Party remains trapped in its group (or narrow apartheid approach to political reform.

While the Nationalist reforms will not result in South Africa's final dispensation of forces they will have an impact upon the majority rule state which follows. A number of structural changes that been introduced which are designed to depoliticize the policy making and planning process. These include municipality status for all black townships in South Africa with the beginnings of multi-racial metropolitan government in regional services councils, the creation of appointed multi-racial Executive committees, made up of Whites, Indians, Colours and Africans, which govern the country's four provinces (and the abolition of the four all white Provincial Councils), a regional planning system which includes, in theory at least the country's ten homelands and at the national a proposal for negotiations over the future of the central government through the establishment of a "national council" which would include blacks from outside the homelands as well as representatives of homeland governments. It is this "national council" which is designed to bring blacks into the racially based "tri-cameral" parliamentary system introduced in 1985, a system which provides representation for South African Indians and Coloureds as well as whites but not for the black majority.

It was this 1983 constitution, with its built in majority for the National Party in the tie breaking President's Council, which created an Executive State Presidency, currently headed by P.W. Botha.<sup>10</sup> While the racial nature of the current government proposals for reforms has led extra-parliamentary forces to reject the national council at this point, all groups, including the African National Congress (ANC) accept the principle of a negotiated settlement to South Africa's problems. This could lead, after all race local government elections in 1988 and racially exclusive national elections in 1989, to the release of Nelson Mandela, the removal of the state of emergency and the unbanning of proscribed organizations. The release of eight political prisoners, including former ANC Secretary General Walter Sisulu by newly elected President F.W. de Klerk, prestige such changes.

Particularly if reforms were accompanied by the abolition of the Group Areas Act, such a scenario could set the stage for meaningful negotiations in the early 1990s.

Related to the patterns of domestic reform and resistance has been the impact of international sanctions and the extent to which this has caused new capital not to flow into South Africa. The current low level of new investment is likely to be heavily impacted by the new (1988) Dellams Bill which mandates almost a complete termination of all trade between the U.S. and South Africa. Even if the bill is not passed in final form until 1990 or later it has already had a major impact on policy makers and bureaucratic elites in South Africa. There is a growing realization among politically aware South Africans, both black and white, that there will be no economic upswing or new investment until there is a final political dispensation in South Africa which is widely accepted both by internal and by external groups. Failure to move toward a negotiated settlement for majority rule will most certainly lead to a further deterioration of the South African economy.<sup>11</sup>

### The Nature of Political and Administrative Structures

Political and administrative structures are important. In spite of all the attention which is paid to South African politics, the structural changes which are now being introduced in the "post-grand apartheid" period are neglected by most political analysts. It is a major thesis of this paper that the impact of these new structures, supported by mainstream social science theory, may both contribute to the dismantling of apartheid and define the strategies of socio-economic and political development which are adopted by a majority rule government.

Social engineering is a part of the continuity of the South African policy process. This social engineering has been fueled by several "ideologies" over the past twenty five years and academics, both international and domestic defined the nature of these ideologies.

This paper suggests ways in which which the state impacts upon society (and is impacted upon) from four separate theoretical perspectives. These theoretical perspectives are the social science "ideologies" which have defined the policy debate in South Africa since 1948. They are modernization theory, dependency theory, corporatist theory and the concept of internal colonialism. In examining political theories within the South African context, I do not merely search for theories which explain the nature of South African political conflict but suggest ways in which political elites have utilized social science theory to promote and attack racially based political structures and public policy.

### Social Science Theory as "Ideology"

#### Modernization Theory

Modernization theory (for example Apter, 1965; Almond and Powell, 1966; Almond, 1970) has played a role in the apartheid process from the policy's origins in the early 1950s. The architects of grand apartheid, when it was introduced in the 1950s, quickly adopted the framework of modernization theory and began a "decolonization" process which, South African academics argued, was a pre-requisite to political and socio-economic modernization. As the ten "homelands" approached "independence" and internal self-government, South African relationships to its apartheid territories were modeled on that of the former colonial power to newly independent national states. In the 1960s and early 1970s, apartheid theorists and practitioners were influenced by the development administration and planning literature. (Bryant and White, 1982; Gant, 1979; Montgomery, 1974; and Waterston, 1969). An elaborate system of development banks, technical assistance, and development management and planning networks evolved both intellectually and in practice as the South African government moved to promote political, economic and social development in its "national states." (Ligthelm and Coetzee, 1984 and van Vuuren, et. al., 1985: 173-209)

An early academic view of the homelands suggested that there were aspects of autonomy built into the homeland system in spite of the severe constraints placed upon them by the South African government (Carter, et.al., 1967). Newell Stultz, for example, suggested that the creation of "independent" homelands represented a form of "power sharing" and was a first step "toward a federal 'United States of Southern Africa.'" (Stultz, 1980:149) For Stultz, the first task was to determine how much power-sharing there was in the homeland system. Did it represent a "half loaf" or a quarter loaf" or (to continue Stultz's analogy) the empty plastic bread wrapper?

### Dependency Theory

Critics of the South African government have often turned to the political economy and, more specifically, the dependency theory literature as an alternative framework of analysis. Ultimately, critics of the homeland policy, using dependency theory, revealed the economic barrenness of homeland policy. Dependency theory, the second theoretical perspective to be examined in this project, suggests that lesser developed states (LDCs) are severely limited in their political sovereignty because international penetration of the LDC economy limits LDC policy choices. (Amin, Arrighi, Frank, and Wallerstein, 1982; Erb and Kallab, 1975; and Wilber, 1979) As a result, a relationship of dependence has developed between elites in the Third World and political and economic elites in the more developed countries (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1981:25). In Southern Africa, Dependency theory would identify a historical relationship between the "homelands" and the sub-metropol existing within the context of the larger South African minority ruled state (Southall, 1975). The dependency links between the homelands, the South African sub-metropol and the



northern tier states would be the key factor in understanding the resultant political structures. The particular form of underdevelopment and dependence which is said to exist in Southern Africa is what Samir Amin labels the "Africa of the labour reserves." Under this system of labor reserves, based in the homelands, "the centre needed to have a large proletariat immediately available" to it. (Amin, 1972:519).

Dependency theory, as an alternative "ideology," has played a role in combating grand apartheid in the last decade. Given the economic implications of apartheid, dependency theory raises a number of critical questions when applied to the homeland system. At the same time, I will argue that the homeland system, as it has evolved in South Africa, presents a formidable challenge to dependency theory as an analytical construct.

Dependency theory suggests that lesser developed states (LDCs) are severely limited in their political sovereignty because of the nature of the international "penetration" of the political system which limits LDC policy choices. As a result, a relationship of dependence has developed between third world political elites and economic and political elites in the "metropol" or northern tier states. The mechanism of penetration and control over LDC political economies is said to be the large Multinational (or Transnational) Corporation located in North America, Western Europe or Japan.<sup>12</sup>

The dependency approach suggests that political-economic decision making exists in a continuum of relationships between autonomy and dependency and that the de jure status of the dependent system has little relevance other than allowing for certain mechanisms of diplomatic communication and access to international and transnational organizations. Since the homelands are not recognized internationally, the issue of diplomatic communications is largely moot.

The core issue raised by dependency theorists writing on the homelands, is the extent to which South Africa is an LDC and whether or not the "white" central government's relationship with its "homelands" is significantly different from relationships between LDCs and more developed states as defined by the political economy approach (Southall, 1985). In the course of his book on the political economy of the Transkei, Southall raised the critical question of how the homelands fit into an overall dependency framework. However, he then ducked the critical issue. For him, the question of whether dependency theory can be extended to include South Africa's homelands as neo-colonial entities is "an ideological rather than a substantive construct." (Southall, 1985:16) A dependency theory analysis of local level politics and political control provides a mechanism to compare "white" South Africa and its "homelands" with internationally recognized neighboring states.

In the homelands, there are all the features of a colony. The Transkei in particular offers opportunity for comparison. It has a separate political history analogous to that of Lesotho and Swaziland. Unlike the other homelands it is geographically

contiguous and its land area and population are both larger than the two internationally recognized independent states. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of all domestic rights and political domination by a group which does everything it can to emphasize and perpetuate alien "European" character of the sub-metropol. (The African Communist as quoted by Slovo, 1977:133)

If local level politics and elite formation is not significantly different in the "homelands" from LDCs, then one would expect that "homeland" leaders would be primarily involved in political control activities and dependent upon political and economic elites in white South Africa. This would suggest the "homelands" are less unique than many writers on South Africa have assumed. The South African attempt to devolve political and administrative functions to a class of indigenous political leaders in the "homelands," in a form of domestic neo-colonialism, may be analogous to the types of transformation in relationships which occurred between colonial powers and their colonies in the 1950s and 1960s.

This has been the dilemma for many critics of the South African government. If there are significantly different patterns of white formation and political control between LDCs and "homelands" in South Africa then one must call into question some of the major assumptions about the primacy of economic control mechanisms posited by dependency theorists. Racial, social and political motivations, under those circumstances, may have worked against the economic interests of those who currently dominate the policy process in South Africa.

Recent attempts to reform South Africa by the Nationalist government suggest that it has abandoned the domestic decolonization processes of grand apartheid because they are counterproductive to the evolving economic system in South Africa. The nature of the arguments suggest an implicit acceptance of dependency arguments by elite reformers. The development of metropolitan centers and regional economies "has eroded the primary division between the 'white' and bantustan areas on which apartheid was constructed; and thus has eroded the dualistic spatial framework on which South Africa's political economy is based." (Cobbett, et al, 1987: 3) In this sense, dependency theorists and other critics of the homeland system may have indirectly influenced policy makers in Pretoria, for the National Party leadership in South Africa now accepts the need for a single economic system in a newly industrializing country (NIC) model of South Africa. (Berger and Goodsell, 1988: 200-239). An examination of the impact of the end of influx control, the legalization of trade unions and the introduction of a system of regional planning and resource transfer suggest that the current leadership in South Africa is attempting to construct a corporatist and depoliticized society based upon elite/group interaction using "consensus" policy making process and deconcentrated planning as a framework for the corporatist structure. Corporatist theory and the experiences of such Latin American countries as Brazil and Argentina have

contributed to this strategy of depoliticized change. (Wiarda, 1973:225)

### Corporatism

The evolution of these corporatist structures and processes at the primary, intermediate and national levels of government will constitute the third framework for analysis in this study. Corporatism is defined by Schmitter (1974:86) as:

a system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state.

In South Africa, the corporatist model has taken the form of consociationalism, or consociational federalism where ethnic and racial groups as well as geographic units are represented. (See Lijphart, 1977: 235-37; Elazar, 1987: 5-20; and Huntington, 1981: 8-27.) Of critical importance is the extent to which a corporatist framework for analysis provides a better understanding for the nature of forces at work in South Africa than the "internal colonialism" theories of both non-marxist and marxist theorists.

Corporatism will allow an analysis of the process of intersection between the state and society within three contexts. These are:

1. what many observers see as the "depoliticization" process which is now occurring in South Africa,
2. the role that development management and planning theory has played in the depoliticization process, and
3. the impact that corporatist structures are likely to have on the development of personalist vs. pluralist rule in a post-apartheid South African state.

There are two components to the "depoliticization" process." The first is an effort to transfer to policy making processes from political to administrative and planning bodies. According to Simond Brand, an advisor to the Prime Minister in 1983,

...if you can take these things out of the political sphere as much as possible then Parliament and the Government play a less important role and it becomes a less important matter for people to necessarily have a certain form of representation in the central Parliament... (Simon Brand, Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, 1983 SA Review, 1, p. 67)

The second, privatization, is the "removing from the sphere of government all functions and services that could be met by the private sector" (South African Review, No. 1, pp. 66-67).

The issue of the individual's relationship to the state is developed in the corporatist theory in terms of a "continuous hierarchy of authority." (Schmitter, 1974:120) The corporate framework may also help to explain the potential survival in a post-apartheid South Africa of earlier "homeland" political structures while allowing for change through the adaptation of new social and political constructs to the administrative apparatus of the state.

### Internal Colonialism

A number of dependency theorists have used the analogy of internal colonialism to discuss the South African homelands. The "internal colonialism" argument was developed by theorists connected to the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. Slovo, for example, argues that what one sees in South Africa is a new type of colonialism in which the "white nation" occupies the same territory as those who are oppressed. In the homelands,

there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of all democratic rights and political domination by a group which does everything it can to emphasise and perpetuate its alien "European" character.<sup>13</sup>

The theory suggests that South Africa, as a settler society, differs from normal colonial states in that the elite "colonial" group and its "colonial" state exist in the same geographic boundaries as the peoples that have been colonized. It is this view of South Africa which predominates among the intellectuals who lead South Africa's major liberation movements. According to this view,

... a state which has the form of a racial dictatorship is best understood, it is argued, as an instance of colonialism... colonial domination..., it occurs within the boundaries of a single political territory. In South Africa the white nation is, on this analysis, identified as the colonial power, and the politically oppressed blacks as the colonised. (Hudson, 1988:268)

The most clearly developed analysis of the homelands as domestic colonies is made by Harold Wolpe. Wolpe argues that a distinctive feature of South African society is that it has internalized an imperialist relationship between the white and the

non-white community. Accordingly to Wolpe, the key to "internal colonialism" lies in

the introduction into the capitalist circuit of production of labor-power physically produces in a non-capitalist economy ... (which) modifies the relationship between wages and the relationship between wages and the cost of reproducing labour-power in favour of capital ... The uniqueness or specificity of South Africa, in the period of capitalism, lies precisely in this: that it embodies within a single nation-state a relationship characteristic of the external relationship between imperialist states and their colonies (or neo-colonies).<sup>14</sup>

Wolpe is somewhat ambiguous as to how to interpret the homelands. According to theories of internal colonialism, the structures of political domination which have been expressed in the policy of apartheid are the result of the needs of the capitalist economy for cheap migrant labor. (Wolpe, 1975:229,250) While Wolpe identifies the importance of the production of labour-power to the maintenance of a "colonial" relationship, he is ambiguous as to how to interpret the homelands. At one point Wolpe refers to the homelands as "sub-states"<sup>15</sup> and as Southall points out, Wolpe "has not sought to confront the problem of whether non-independent bantustans (sub-states) might emerge to independence as states (or neo-colonies)."<sup>16</sup> Southall warn us of the pitfalls inherent in this line of reasoning. He argues:

Thus even if the thrust of his analysis proposes that the bantustans, whatever their status, are integrally embedded into the apartheid political economy, the implication of the notion of internal colonialism might appear to be that the relationship it describes can be externalized in the form of a bantustan neo-colonialism. Yet the dangers inherent in such an approach are self-evident, and it would be peculiarly ironic if Wolpe's Maxian analysis were to be distorted into legitimating apartheid ideology.<sup>17</sup>

Having, in the course of a book on the political economy of the Transkei, raised the critical question of how the homelands fit into an overall dependency framework, Southall then goes on to duck the critical issue. For him, the question of whether internal colonialism can be extended to include South Africa's homelands as neo-colonial entities is "an ideological rather than a substantive construct."<sup>18</sup>

In one sense, internal colonialism as view of African politics is related to that put forward by Stoltz in his study of the Transkei (Newell M. Stultz, Transkei's Half Loaf: Race Separatism in South Africa, Cape Town: David Philip, 1979). Stultz suggests

that the South African homeland system merely represents a new phase in a long history of "domestic colonialism" that has evolved throughout South African history. Decolonization of the part (the homeland) thus has at least as much meaning as the decolonization of such small states as the Gambia, Togo or Swaziland. Internal colonialism as a theory extends "domestic colonialism" from the homelands to South Africa as a whole. Internal colonialism is a form of land based colonialism in which the state, representing a racial or ethnic segment of the society, establishes authoritarian bureaucratic (colonial) mechanisms to govern unrepresented population groups. Proponents of this view suggest that focus on the homelands is to miss the point and that the homelands are "largely meaningless" in terms of any kind of equitable power-sharing within the multi-national South African state.<sup>19</sup> This view suggests that the "independence" of four of the South African homelands is irrelevant except perhaps in tracing lines of communication between the racially based political sub-unit and the center in Pretoria. Decolonization means the liberation of all South Africa in political, economic and psychological terms.

The internal colonialism framework suggests that for political transformation to occur in South Africa something akin to a national "decolonization" process must occur. Casanova (1965) uses the concept of colonialism in both the intranational and international sense to explain the development of political structures in the new nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. He suggests, in his discussion of internal colonialism in Mexico, that the national government has a direct political and economic stake in proceeding to dismantle the structural components of internal colonialism. (Casanova, 1965: 36) This process, different from the partial decolonization of grand apartheid, deemed the "national democratic revolution," will result in a broadly based majority rule government made up of a coalition of middle class and working class forces.

### The Local State

The focus in the wider study which follows from this paper will be on the local state. It accepts Frankel's premise that "The crisis of local government is ultimately linked with and forms an important part of the national crisis in South Africa." (Frankel, et. al. p. 110.) Furthermore, it is in the refashioning of the local state that the current South African government hopes to control events after the transition to majority rule through a depoliticization and privatization process that reduces the extent to which state structures are the arena for the competition over scarce resources.

The overall thrust will be to examine the "local state" from each of these four above perspectives in order to determine what light the theories bring to an understanding of South African politics and to examine the extent to which the contradictory nature of the process of conflict and change in the country are related to different visions of the future which are linked to

these four theories of state-local level interaction. The effect of the top down strategy adopted by the state has been to place local government in the forefront of national political struggles." (SAR4, p. 110).

All the myriad forms of local, intermediate and national administration and bureaucratic control will be examined in this research including South Africa's municipal and city councils, provincial administration, regional planning and development units and the country's ten administrative/security areas. Of particular concern will be the structural reforms introduced by the Botha government at the local, intermediate and national levels of government in the past ten years, including the creation of regional services councils and joint management councils, the "depoliticization" of provinces, and the creation of development and planning regions. Examination of the local state will be seen within the context of state transformation and continuity at the national level. At the same time, in spite of the conservative reforms that have been introduced in the last ten years (and the potential for meaningful negotiations between the Nationalist government and the African National Congress in the next few years), I will argue that it remains necessary for analysts to deal with both the political and the development problems raised by the existence of South Africa's ten "homelands."

#### A Residual Problem: The Issue of the Homelands

There is a Ptolemy village atmosphere about South Africa's homelands. To drive into Bophuthatswana from Botswana (through the front door so to speak) one must have a Bophuthatswana visa and pass through Bophuthatswana immigration and customs formalities. The border post has all the trappings of an international state. To enter Bophuthatswana from Pretoria or Johannesburg is another matter, however. Coming into the homeland from this direction (by the back door, so to speak) one sees no border posts, no customs or immigration officials and therefore a visa is not necessary. There may or may not be a sign on the road indicating that you have crossed the border.<sup>20</sup>

Beyond the tragi-comic image of the homelands as mini-states, however, they provide a formidable challenge to the political analyst. The critical question is how to interpret the geographical entities created by South African "homelands" for the African majority of the troubled country.

The usual image of the South African homelands is of squalid dusty, rural villages isolated from the white urban centers of the country. Many homelands are isolated and rural of course. However, the racial partitioning of South Africa also serves to create bedroom communities of urban workers who can be conveniently shunted back across the "border" at night. As far as possible, South African policy has been to incorporate black urban townships into one of the "homeland states." Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu and

Ciskei all have dormitory communities of hundreds of thousands of people within commuter distance from white metropolitan areas.

Much of the international press coverage of South Africa focuses on developments in South Africa's urban black townships. Townships such as Soweto are portrayed as poverty stricken urban ghettos and have become symbolic of the country's apartheid systems. However, as Alister Sparks points out, the real poverty and suffering under South Africa's apartheid system is not in the urban black townships but in the rural areas. Thus,

...the homelands are dumping grounds for the economically redundant masses of the black population, "Superfluous" Africans, which often means wives and children, are sent there by the thousands under influx-control laws that are designed to keep them out of the industrial cities.<sup>21</sup>

South African policy makers continue to see a dichotomy between urban Africans who will have to be brought into the country's socio-economic system, albeit in a subordinate position, (and perhaps eventually be brought into the political process) and rural Africans in country's ten homelands who will remain indefinitely separated from the South African economy. The strategy is to improve the opportunities of urban Africans but at the same time ensure the unemployed remain in the homelands. If necessary, excess labor can be exported to the homeland areas.<sup>22</sup> Urban dwellers inside the homelands can be available for labor purposes but without the need to be conscious of their political or socio-economic aspirations.

Political developments in South Africa's homelands have been somewhat neglected by academics because perhaps, in the minds of some, to write about the South African homelands is to justify their existence. Structures of mediation and control are a reality for seventeen million black South Africans however and the impact that homeland regimes have upon their subjects is a major component of the South African political process.

Moreover, critical decisions are being made now about political and administrative structures in South Africa which could have long term implications for the future regardless of what changes may be made at the national political level. The creation of the homeland system has meant the creation of a system of homeland based elites. "In spite of everything," as Roger Southall points out, "the will to survive on the part of the locally ruling elements will be there..."<sup>23</sup> in spite of external pressures or evolutionary changes which might transform the nature of the South African state.

Separate development (or apartheid), as it evolved in the early 1950s, rather than being a departure from an earlier policy of racial domination reflects a continuity of domestic colonial relationships that goes back to the early nineteenth century and the interaction between Dutch settlement and British rule during that period.



The particular form of underdevelopment and dependence which is said to exist in Southern Africa is what Samir Amin labels the "Africa of the labour reserves." Under this system of labor reserves, "the centre needed to have a large proletariat immediately available" to it.<sup>24</sup> This labor reserve, drawn from throughout the Southern and Eastern African region, produced a reservoir of cheap labour available for the farms, factories and mines of Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Since the worker was underpaid in terms of the value of his labor, salaried employment was not able to sustain the individual and his/her family. Thus the family unit continued to depend upon subsistence agriculture (grown by those left behind in the rural area). The labor reserve system meant that patterns of subsistence agriculture in effect "subsidized" the commercial farm, the mine or the factory which drew labor from the reserve.

The important issue to be addressed is to what extent South Africa's relationship with its "independent homelands" as labor reserves is significantly different empirically from relationships between internationally recognized Southern African states and the metropol as defined by the political economy approach. Since four of the ten homelands have now been granted "independence" by South Africa, the question of whether or not they constitute dependent "states" (whether internationally recognized or not) is critical to an understanding of Southern African politics.

There are a number of ways in which the South African "homelands" are usually distinguished from internationally recognized LDCs. First of all, all of the homelands, with the exception of the Transkei, are geographic fragments, black spots in a white South African. They represent only a fraction (less than 14%) of the total land base of the Republic and all but the smallest homelands are geographically fragmented into two or more separate pieces. KwaZulu for example is made up of ten separate geographical units.

Secondly, the homelands were created on the basis of mandatory ethnic exclusivity as a mechanism for ensuring the non-participation of Africans in the white South African core and as a justification for that exclusion. As racial constructs they were the end point of the South African concept of apartheid which assumes white South Africans are superior in terms of their culture and political values and that whites should dominate the national government in South Africa. All other racial and language groups were to be kept separate from the whites and from each other in order to prevent the outbreak of primordial violence within the South African policy.

Finally, the homelands were artificial constructs carved out of what the international community recognized as a unitary South African state. The partition of South Africa violates the principle of the Organization of African Unity that suggests the inviolability of colonial boundaries.

From a political economy perspective, the question is to what extent do the historical circumstances of the homelands' origins analytically, as opposed to juridically, distinguish them from

internationally recognized LDCs. From a dependency theory perspective, the homelands represent a pattern of evolution toward neo-colonial status not dissimilar from African states further north. The homelands' evolution toward "neo-colonial status" represented, in the 1960s, the South African government's response to the development of African nationalism. How, this logic would suggest, are Lesotho and Swaziland more "independent" than Bophuthatswana or the Transkei?

The approach here suggests that in order to determine the "uniqueness" of the South African homelands, one must start with the evolution of the racially based sub-state structures in South Africa and examine the process of elite formation and the patterns of political economy which it produced throughout the region. There are several components of a political economy approach to the homelands issue. First, what is the nature of the bureaucratic state mechanisms which are now in place? These control mechanisms are crucial to continued patterns of political and economic dependency. Secondly, the nature of the political elite system which is evolving in South Africa will suggest the nature of the elites within South Africa and within the Southern African region.

Further the pattern of homeland development must be linked in the economic extent. Does South Africa, in part or as a whole, represent the kind of dependent economic development that is usually associated with Latin America, a pattern of dependent development in which the strategy of economic growth requires a set of control mechanisms to slow down demands for political participation?<sup>25</sup> Finally, if maintenance of the homelands was conducive to the needs of the capitalist state in the 1960s under grand-apartheid, what is the explanation for the evolution to a single regional and national economy now promulgated by the Nationalist Party in the 1980s?

Avoidance of the delicate issues that relate to the homeland structures is wide spread. The problem is that to open the possibility that the Transkei, or any other homeland is a discrete entity, even in a de facto sense, is to acknowledge that as an internal "colony" a homeland can be "decolonized." This "concedes to state ideology the claim that the Transkei region is an autonomous entity (an internal colony to be decolonized) and thus further serves to mystify its position within the South African social formation."<sup>26</sup> Empirical analysis must give way to normative preferences.

This logic assumes that one must a priori assume that the Transkei is a sub-national region of South Africa, forming an integral part of the whole. Southall puts it this way,

if we accept the notion of Transkei as substantively a neo-colony then we reify the concept of ba'ustan "statehood." Such a concession., whether intentional or not, would clearly be a political act...<sup>27</sup>

Since social science is not value free, the researcher must choose not to classify the Transkei as a neo-colony for political and

historical reasons in order to "confront rather than to legitimate the practice and implementation of apartheid rule and ideology."<sup>28</sup>

This approach leaves the analyst in danger of ignoring some of the fundamental issues raised by dependency theory, first, that LDC states are penetrated or soft and secondly that they are made up of comprador domestic elites who assist the metropol in regulating an LDC's political economy. The question of whether or not the homelands differ significantly from internationally recognized LDC's is an empirical one, and one which needs to be addressed even within the context of a normative problematique which plagues the issue.

One might prefer that the state structure embodied in the homelands not reflect the "neo-colonial" pattern of internationally recognized LDC's because of fears of a reinforcement of the ideology of apartheid. However, the critical question, not only for South Africa, but for LDC's more generally, is whether or not the nature of LDC state structures and processes can make a difference in the search for autonomous and self-sufficient strategies of economic development. Analytically, the homelands can be treated as ethnically based local or sub-national authorities with a high degree of economic dependency both on "white" South Africa and on the international economic system. From there, one can go on to examine political structures and processes within the context of the political economy of the Southern African region. Whatever the normative distaste of the homelands, the researcher should not ignore their presence.

### Conclusion

The purpose of the study is three fold. First, the research attempts to understand the impact of the local level state apparatus on South African society today. Secondly, given that bureaucratic and control structures are often more durable than personalities and political movements, this research will attempt to determine the extent that patterns of administration and control at the local level now being introduced will survive into the post-apartheid majority rule state. Finally, the research attempts to understand the impact that the homeland structures are likely to have on the evolution toward a post-apartheid South Africa.

In trying to understand the nature of the South African urban townships and the homeland system one must focus at least in part upon the effect that local level state structures and homeland regimes have upon those who live within their artificial boundaries. This research hopes to examine the nature of this impact. In the homelands, one would project very limited penetration of state institutions outside of "homeland capitals" and that local level political structures would be nonexistent or underdeveloped.

Similar questions must be asked when one examines the nature of politics in internationally recognized states of course. In examining the homeland system in South Africa one concern must be the extent to which the impact of the homeland on those caught within its "borders" is significantly different than, for example,

the impact of internationally recognized Southern African states (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland) upon its citizens.

1. Velenleni Mashumi, "A Daily Fray for City's Commuters." Pretoria News June 4, 1984, p. 13.

2. These figures come from Keith Gottschalk, "State Strategy and the Limits of Counter-Revolution," in South African Review 4, Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery, eds. (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), pp. 503-506.

3. Ibid., p. 506.

4. Hill, Change in South Africa, p. 52.

5. Groups which are committed to unrestricted majority rule in Southern Africa and which are committed to resist the unilateral, and partial reforms introduced by the Botha administration. See Tom Lodge, "State Power and the Politics of Resistance," in Work in Progress, nos. 50/51 (October/November, 1987), pp. 3-6 for a discussion of this resistance.

6. An eighteenth, the End Conscription Campaign was proscribed by the state on August 23, 1988. See David Braun, "Anti-draft group 'banned' by Vlok," Star (Johannesburg), August 22, 1988.

7. See for example Ivor Sarakinsky, "The State of the State and the State of Resistance, in Work in Progress, no. 52 (March, 1988), pp. 47-51 and Jacklyn Cock, "A High Price for Freedom: Militarisation and White South Africa," in Work in Progress, no. 53 (April/May, 1988), pp. 19-23.

8. The best analysis of the conflict between South Africa and its neighbors is Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1986).

9. An analysis of this by an academic close to the Nationalist Party is G.C. Olivier, "The Prospects for Future Stability or Instability in South Africa in On Razor's Edge: Prospects for Political Stability in Southern Africa, Calvin A. Woodward, ed. (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1986), pp. 121-133.

10. An up date date account of these changes and their impact upon South African politics is Philip H. Frankel, et.al., ed. State Resistance and Change in South Africa, (London: Croom Helm, 1988).

11. Newspaper accounts in South Africa reflect this concern. See for example, Michael Chester, "Sitting on an Economic Time Bomb," Star (Johannesburg), July 14, 1988, p. 10, John Spira, "Why Alarm Bells Are Ringing for Sick Rand," Star Review, (Johannesburg), July 31, 1988, p. 1 and "Growth Likely to Stay Sluggish," The Citizen, (Johannesburg), August 6, 1988, p. 17.

12. The dependency literature is much too voluminous to cite here. Pathfinding studies include Paul Baron, Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957) Keith Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America (London: Geogre Allen and Unwin, 1969), Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Moderen World System: Capatalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1974). Attempts to apply dependency theory directly tro Africa include Samir Amin, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa (new York: Monthly Review Press, 1973, Colin Leys, The Underdevelopment of Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1975) and Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1967).

13. The African Communist, 1st Quarter, 1963, pp. 24-70 quoted in Joe Slovo, "South Africa-No Middle Road," in Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo and Anthony R. Wilkinson, Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 133.

14. Harold Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case," in Beyond the Sociology of Development: Econcmly and Society in Latin America and Africa, Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth, eds. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 245. and p. 248.

15. In Harold Wolpe, "The Changing Class Sturcture of South Africa: The African Petit-Bourgeoisie," in Research in Political Economy, Paul Zarembka, ed., (Grenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1978). pp. 143-174.

16. Southall, South Afric's Transkei, p. 17.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell M. Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism, (Evanston, 1].: Northwestern Unviersity Press, 1967). pp. 175.184.

20. It is also true that people who are denied entry into South Africa can sometimes cross the Botswana border into Bophuthatswana. From Mmabatho they then have free run into the Withwatersrand and beyond as long as they don't get caught by South African roadblocks.

21. Allister Sparks, "The Real Soweto, " /sunday Observer Magazine (May 13, 1984), pp. 24-31.

22. Christopher Hill, Change in South Africa: Blind Alleys or New Directions? (London: Rex Collings, 1983), p. 52. See also A. Claasens, "The Riekert Commission and Unemployment: The Kwa Zulu Case, " South Africa Labour Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 4 (November, 1979), pp. 49-64.

23. Roger Southall, South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), p. 303\_

24. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa-Origins and Contemporary Forms," Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 10, no. 4 (1972, p. 519.

25. See for example the arguments made by Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State," Latin American Research Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (1978), pp. 3-38.

26. Duncan Innes and Dan O'Meara, "Class Formation and Ideology: The Transkei Region," in Review of African Political Economy, no., 7 (September-December, 1976), p. 70.

27. Southall, South Africa's Transkei, p. 17.

28. Ibid.